Sen, Marx and justice: a critique by Ian Fraser (1249335)
International Journal of Social Economics
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sen, Marx and Justice: A Critique 
 
 
Journal: International Journal of Social Economics 
Manuscript ID IJSE-08-2015-0202.R1 
Manuscript Type: Research Paper 
Keywords: Sen, Marx, Justice 
  
 
 
International Journal of Social Economics
International Journal of Social Economics
1 
 
Sen, Marx and Justice: A Critique  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Purpose (limit 100 words)  
This article offers a critique of Sen’s utilisation of aspects of Marx’s 
thought that inform his idea of justice. Marx’s ideas appear in four main 
areas of discussion: Sen’s positioning of Marx with other thinkers in his 
approach to justice; Marx’s fluid notion of identity and its relation to 
social choice; the problem of transcending a subjective perspective to 
consider objective concerns through the impact of what Sen calls 
‘objective illusion’; and the issue of just redistribution.  
 
 Design/methodology/approach (limit 100 words)  
I utilise a Marxian framework of analysis that engages in an immanent 
critique of Sen’s use of Marx in his theory of justice. This is 
accomplished by textual analysis and a critical assessment of the 
analytical Marxist tradition that Sen can be seen as using in his own 
theories with all their inherent weaknesses. 
 
 Findings (limit 100 words)  
Sen’s attempt to use Marx’s ideas to inform his theory of justice founder 
because: he groups Marx with thinkers that would not accept his desire 
for the abolition of capitalism and a more just society. He reduces Marx 
to the analytical Marxist tradition with all its inherent weaknesses. He 
resorts to a methodological individualist approach of choice that Marx 
rejects. Sen’s search for positional objectivity is undermined by the 
power of capitalist ideology and ruling class interest. His discussion of 
just redistribution ignores how Marx’s approach can overcome the 
arbitrariness that Sen presumes is inevitable when making just 
decisions. 
 
Research limitations/implications (limit 100 words)  
Theoretically, the article suggests that, based on immanent critique and 
textual analysis, Sen’s use of Marx for his idea of justice is problematic 
most notably because Sen keeps his analysis within the framework of 
capitalism that Marx would reject. The implication for further research is 
the development of Marx’s own arguments on what constitutes a just 
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Amartya Sen won the Nobel Prize in Economics but his intellectual terrain 
has transcended disciplinary boundaries into the political, social and 
philosophical throughout his illustrious career (Morris, 2009, p. 1).     
Interviewed in 2009 as his magisterial The Idea of Justice was published, 
Sen pondered on his student days at the University of Calcutta (1951-53) 
and reflected that at that time ‘Whether you sat in Calcutta, Saigon, 
Tokyo or Peking, Marx was a huge presence. Marxism was anti-imperialist 
and also intellectual. So I was attracted by that’ (Derbyshire, 2009). Even 
so, as the interviewer noted, Sen was never a Marxist, being more drawn 
to the work of Adam Smith and in particular his Theory of Moral 
society.   
 
Practical implications (limit 100 words)  
Practically, the article raises questions about the viability of achieving 
justice within the capitalist system for the reasons discussed in relation 
to Sen.   
 
Social implications (limit 100 words)  
Socially, the article implies that far greater measures to tackle the 
injustices of the w rld are necessary than seem to be admitted to by 
justice theorists such as Sen.    
 
 Originality/value (limit 100 words)  
I show that the use of Marx’s theories to inform Sen’s notion of justice, 
while to be welcomed, lose their efficacious power to expose the full 
injustice of capitalism and the need for its transcendence.  
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Sentiments both then and for the rest of his life. However, Sen’s 
intellectual trajectory is more varied than that as he himself had declared 
three years earlier when he stated: ‘I take much pride (and I think that is 
the right word) in the fact that my ideas are not “rootless” – they are in 
the “tradition” established by some very great people’, and these 
‘intellectual instigators’ include: Aristotle, Adam Smith, Mary 
Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx and Kenneth Arrow (Sen, 
2006, pp. 80-1). Sen’s adolescent attraction towards Marx developed into 
the mature ‘pride’ of being influenced by his ideas, ‘notably for teaching 
us that the most terrible inequalities may be hidden behind an illusion of 
normality and justice’. I begin by briefly examining how Marx fits into 
Sen’s overall approach to justice and Sen’s inclusion of him with other 
theorists. I then consider how he praises Marx for his more nuanced 
understanding of human identity that was not simply based on class but 
included other social groupings (Sen, 2010, pp. 245, 247 and 2009, pp. 
120-1). Sen also cites Marx’s analysis of ‘false consciousness’ or 
‘objective illusion’ as a ‘concept that he uses in his investigation of the 
underdogs in the class hierarchy’ and which also informs Sen’s 
understanding of justice (Sen, 2006, p. 82; See also, 2010, p. 163-4; 
2005, p. 8; 2003, p. 322). Finally, I explore the conflicting claims that can 
arise from Sen’s endorsement of Marx as part of his discussion of just 
distribution (Sen, 2010, pp. x, 12-15, 297; 2009, pp. 120-21; 1984, pp. 
73, 80, 285 and 291; 1982, p. 250 and 427).  
 
Page 3 of 32 International Journal of Social Economics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Social Economics
4 
 
Notwithstanding these points of contact between the two thinkers, Sen’s 
engagement with Marx on the issue of justice is stochastic and often 
limited. My aim in this article is, on the basis of what Sen has said above, 
to create a debate between Sen and Marx across these themes where he 
does engage with Marx and this is mainly in The Idea of Justice. I argue 
that the overall problem with Sen’s use of Marx regarding justice is that 
the injustices Sen speaks of are systemically created by capitalism. If Sen 
or any other theorist of justice wants to use Marx then they must start 
with that fundamental fact. They of course cannot because they assume 
justice can be achieved within capitalism whereas for Marx it was only 
fully achievable with its abolition1 Only by relating a theory of justice to 
Marx’s critique of capitalism can we grasp its explanatory power in 
overcoming the injustices Sen identifies in the world today but which his 
own theories cannot overcome.2 
 
Sen’s Marx 
The Marx that emerges from Sen’s engagement with him in his theory of 
justice is the Marx that has been appropriated by the analytical Marxist 
tradition. (For a representative sample of this approach see Roemer, 
1989.) The approach is ‘inspired by Marxian questions’ using the 
‘contemporary tools of logic, mathematics…model building’ and ‘an 
unabashed commitment to the necessity for abstraction’ (Roemer, 1989b, 
p. 3).3 Sen accordingly abstracts discusions of Marx where his critique is 
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greatest, namely where Marx insists on the need to abolish capitalism and 
create a communist society. Sen forces Marx into a more flattened-down 
persona as one among many reformers who want to see more justice in 
the world but presume it can be achieved within capitalism as is evinced 
when Sen begins to explain his idea of justice further. 
 
Regarding the Enlightenment, Sen identifies two main groupings 
concerning reasoning about justice (Sen, 2010, pp. xv-xvi). The first 
group consists of social contract theorists epitomised by Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau, and Kant. The second group consists of those who took a 
variety of approaches focusing on behaviour, social interactions, and 
institutions, and include Smith, Condorcet, Wollstonecraft, Bentham, Marx 
and John Stuart Mill.   
 
Beginning with the social contract approach, Sen refers to it as 
‘“transcendental institutionalism”’ because it tries to establish just 
institutional arrangements for a society and contains two main aspects 
(Sen, 2010, p. 5). One is the search for perfect justice rather than 
comparing the just with the unjust, and the other is typified by trying to 
prioritise the right type of institutions to attain perfection without 
considering conceivable alternative societies (Sen, 2010, pp. 5-6). In 
contrast, the comparative approach, which Sen refers to as a ‘realisation-
focused comparison’, does not limit its analysis to a transcendentalist 
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search for a just society, but instead makes comparisons between existing 
societies or possible new ones to try to remove injustice in the world 
(Sen, 2010, p. 7). Sen proclaims that the difference between the two 
approaches is ‘momentous’ and notes that it is the ‘transcendental 
institutionalism’ approach that dominates contemporary political 
philosophy as exemplified most potently in the work of John Rawls but 
also in other thinkers such as Ronald Dworkin, David Gauthier and Robert 
Nozick (Sen, 2010, pp. 7-8). Sen associates himself with the comparative 
approach and states that the aim of his book is to ‘investigate realisation-
based comparisons that focus on the advancement or retreat of justice’ 
(Sen, 2010, p. 8). In particular, he identifies with the analytical and 
mathematical discipline of social choice theory developed by Condorcet in 
the eighteenth century, and continued by Kenneth Arrow in the twentieth 
(Sen, 2010, p. xvi). Sen departs from the transcendental approach 
because it asks what would be perfectly just institutions, whereas the 
comparative approach correctly asks how would justice be advanced 
(Sen, 2010, p. 9). A further consequence of this is that it changes the 
preoccupation with institutions and rules to considering the actual 
realisations of justice in particular societies, which Sen suggests will 
require a ‘radical change in the formulation of the theory of justice’.  
 
He then contemplates objections to the role of reason in our deliberations 
because unreason is prevalent in the world and it is therefore optimistic to 
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think reason can always prevail (Sen, 2010, pp. xvii-xviii). Sen’s response 
is that even arguments based on unreason do have some kind of reason 
behind them though of a ‘primitive and very defective kind’ (Sen, 2010, p. 
xviii). His hope is that bad reasoning can be confronted by better 
reasoning that allows for the possibility of ‘reasoned engagement’ even 
though people may refuse to participate initially. What is important for 
Sen is not the claim for the universal presence of reason in everyone’s 
thinking, but a commitment to examine ‘what reasoning would demand 
for the pursuit of justice’ while allowing for the existence of different 
reasonable positions (Sen, 2010, p. ix). He realises that not everyone will 
undertake this examination, yet reasoning is crucial in a world of 
unreason if we are to understand justice, according to Sen.  
 
One of the defining characteristics of The Idea of Justice that gives the 
book the possibility of a wide appeal is its reasonableness and its attempt 
to combine diverse traditions and thinkers; but this can also be seen as 
one of its weaknesses. Sen admits that while sharing a point of departure 
with these ‘diverse’ theorists it does not mean that he agrees with their 
substantive ideas (Sen, 2010, p. 9). He contends that this should be 
‘obvious enough since they themselves differed so much from each other’ 
and especially in the way they wanted the world to be. It is here that 
Sen’s inclusion of Marx with these thinkers seems very odd as what unites 
all of them, but not him, is their acceptance of the capitalist system 
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rather than its abolition. This is not a minor detail in the search for a 
more just world but a revolutionary desire that makes Marx stand apart 
from them. Sen also recognises that they all differ from each other but 
tries to force them together because they all wanted to create a more just 
world. But again this seems unconvincing because of the different worlds 
they envisaged. So it is difficult to see how Marx would feel comfortable 
being grouped with thinkers such as John Stuart Mill and Bentham for 
instance, on what constitutes a just society. When Marx mentions Mill, 
which is only infrequently, he does so in a derisive manner with minimal 
engagement with his views (Balassa, 1959, p. 147. See Duncan, 2009 for 
the main differences between Marx and Mill). One of Marx’s main 
criticisms of Mill was his accommodation to and promotion of capitalism 
which is why Marx ironically praised him as one of the ‘“great intellects”’ 
whose work on political economy only further proved the ‘insipid flatness 
of our present bourgeoisie’ and attempted to ‘reconcile the irreconcilable’ 
(Marx, 1988, pp. 654 and 98). Referring to Mill’s ‘eclectic logic’, Marx 
rebukes him for holding contradictory opinions and mocks his assertion 
that he was the new Adam Smith (Marx, p. 221). Again his work on 
political economy is dismissed as ‘neither extensive nor profound’. 
Bentham receives even further disdain as Marx dismissed him as a 
‘homespun manufacturer of commonplaces’ and rejected outright his 
principle of utility because it ‘assumes that the modern petty bourgeois, 
especially the English petty bourgeois, is the normal man’ (Marx, 1988, 
pp. 758-759, n. 51). By applying his principle of utility to humans, 
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Bentham does not realise that he first needs to deal with ‘human nature 
in general, and then with human nature as historically modified in each 
epoch’. Marx concludes that Bentham is the epitome of ‘bourgeois 
stupidity’. So including Marx with these other thinkers ignores his 
complete rejection of their acceptance and defence of bourgeois society 
and the continuation of capitalism. The eclecticism that Sen desires 
because he wants wide agreement and inclusivity to make his theory of 
justice viable simply forces Marx into the company of thinkers that his 
own approach  would reject because it is based on abolishing rather than 
preserving capitalism, which is an outcome that Sen would not accept. 
This is further exacerbated when we now consider Sen’s discussion of 
Marx on identity and social choice.  
 
Identity and Social Choice 
For Sen, Marx realised that class analysis was important but that it 
needed to be enhanced by recognising that people are members of a 
number of social groupings. Sen cites as evidence The Critique of the 
Gotha Programme where Marx states that the mistake of the United 
Workers’ Party of Germany was that it considered workers only as 
workers and ‘“nothing more is seen in them”’ (Sen, 2010, p. 247; Marx). 
Sen relates this to the current intellectual climate where individuals can 
be identified in one social category to the exclusion of all others, be it a 
Muslim, a Jew and so on. For Sen, following Marx, ‘individual human 
Page 9 of 32 International Journal of Social Economics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Social Economics
10 
 
beings with their various plural identities, multiple affiliations and diverse 
associations are quintessentially social creatures with different types of 
societal interactions’ (Sen, 2010, p. 247). Consequently, seeing a person 
as a member of one social group ignores the ‘breadth and complexity of 
any society in the world’ (Sen, 2010, p. 247). 
 
Sen endorses Marx further because he grasps how individuals are social 
beings that make choices and perform actions in a process of societal 
relations (Sen, 2010, p. 245). Sen mentions the Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts here for support (Marx, 1959, p. 104), but Marx 
does not talk about the issue of choice, although he certainly understands 
the self as a social self. Interestingly, Sen also references John Elster 
(1985) simultaneously with Marx but strangely suggests that the 
‘presence of individuals who think, choose and act – a manifest reality in 
the world – does not make an approach methodologically individualist’ 
(Sen, 2010, p. 245). I say strangely because Elster’s rational choice 
Marxism, part of the analytical Marxist tradition discussed earlier, is based 
on the premise of methodological individualism that Sen’s negative 
reference to this approach as a ‘feared beast’ seems to ignore (See, 
Elster, 1985, pp. 5-8). Sen rightly rejects the ‘illegitimate invoking of any 
presumption of independence of the thoughts and actions of persons from 
the society around them’ that results in methodological individualism, but 
seems unaware that is what Elster’s approach does. As Elster explains, 
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the notion of methodological individualism means that ‘all social 
phenomena – their structure and their change - are in principle explicable 
in ways that only involve individuals – their properties beliefs and their 
actions’, resulting in a ‘form of reductionism’ (Elster, 2010, p. 5). For 
Marx, this is mistaken because individuals are not isolated otherwise they 
would be the Robinsonades that he was critical of Smith and Ricardo as 
positing as a ‘true’ understanding of individuals, rather than how they 
really are: social beings. Smith and Ricardo imagine individuals in this 
way to account for the non-social atomised beings that were created by 
the development from feudalism to industrial capitalism (Marx, 1973, pp. 
83-85).  
 
Sen suggests he surmounts this problem by embracing Marx’s 
understanding of people as being members of multiple groups, but Sen 
descends into the Robinsonade individualism that Marx condemns by 
proposing that only individuals are concerned with justice because 
practical reasoning is carried out by individuals and not by groups (Sen, 
2010, pp. 246-7; Deneulin, 2011, pp. 792-793). Sen sees group 
membership as militating against our capacity for reasoning and 
deliberating about justice because it is subsumed in the level of 
collaboration that people have with each other, and can result in a 
limitation on their capacity for deliberation. Yet this dislocates humans 
from the structured world they inhabit when they make their decisions 
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and which can therefore reinforce instances of injustice. Just as it is 
incorrect to engage in reductionism down to the individual, so it is 
illegitimate to engage in a subsumption of that individual by being a 
member of one group. Sen is proposing a false dichotomy based on an 
undialectical understanding of the self, which, when grasped dialectically, 
operates through many different discourses for understanding the world. 
(See Fraser, 2007 for a dialectical understanding of the self in Marx.)  
 
Sen then tries to incorporate Marx into the social choice tradition (Sen, 
2010, pp. 410-411). Sen reflects that social choice theory from Condorcet 
to Kenneth Arrow has influenced his own approach ‘on making evaluative 
comparisons over distinct social realisations’. He maintains that ‘in this 
respect it has similarities with those in the comparative tradition’ of which 
Marx is designated as being a member along with Adam Smith, Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill, as we saw earlier. Sen observes that the 
value of social choice theory is that it is ‘deeply concerned with the 
rational basis of social judgements and public decisions in choosing 
between social alternatives’ (Sen, 2010, p. 95). Just how this relates to 
Marx is never explained by Sen but it is difficult to interpret Marx within 
this tradition given it again focuses on the issue of choice and does not 
problematise the notion of rationality. Sen presumes a reasonableness 
that dissipates when confronted with the ideology of class privilege and 
interest once choices are located within the structure of capitalism.  
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Objective Illusion 
Marx also informs Sen’s discussion of illusion when considering the 
epistemological need to ‘transcend the limitations of our positional 
perspectives’ in the search for justice and the rooting out of injustice 
(Sen, 2010, p. 155). Sen realises that the latter can be difficult given our 
inability to always comprehend what is happening in the things that we 
see, an inability which arises from the limitations of our own perspective. 
Sen explains these ‘positional variations of observations’ by considering a 
claim that the sun and the moon look similar in size (Sen, 2010, p. 156). 
He sees this as a positional claim even though it is not made explicit, 
because in reality the view is made from the position of the earth. A 
person in a similar position could confirm the statement but another 
person could also make a claim about how things might appear from a 
different position, where the sun and the moon would not look similar in 
size, a position which is not in tension with the previous statement. 
 
Sen argues that ‘positional objectivity’ requires interpersonal invariance 
when the observational position is fixed, and this is compatible with what 
is seen from different positions. The objective aspect is that any person 
adopting a particular position will make the same observations, and 
thereby the two aspects of positional variability are not entirely subjective 
(Sen, 2010, pp. 157-158). So an observational statement is not 
necessarily a statement about the working of a person’s psyche because it 
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also establishes physical qualities, such as the size of the sun and the 
moon, which are independent of anyone’s mind (Sen, 2010, 158). For 
Sen, this raises the issue of positional objectivity that can differ in certain 
circumstances, as in relation-based personal responsibilities with regard 
to prioritising one’s children, for example, and ignoring the needs of other 
children. Nevertheless, the need for a better theory of justice must 
overcome this limitation and try to take a ‘“positionally unbiased”’ 
approach (Sen, 2010, 160-161). This would entail recognising, for 
example, that other people’s children are also to be taken into account 
when making decisions in relation to your own offspring (Sen, 2010, p. 
161). Sen specifies that this involves a search for a ‘position-independent’ 
or a ‘transpositional understanding’ of the world, that goes beyond 
positional prejudice and sectional favouritism.  
 
Sen explains that even when a position-independent view is taken there 
are still obstacles in achieving an unbiased comprehension (Sen, 2010, p. 
161). People can find it difficult to transcend their positionally limited 
visions as is the case, for instance, in societies that have a long history in 
subordinating women so it becomes a cultural norm and an accepted way 
of life (Sen, 2010, p. 162). One way to counter this could be to consider a 
different society where women are allowed to flourish rather than being 
discriminated against. To do so means adopting a position of ‘“open 
impartiality”’ or Adam Smith’s notion of the impartial spectator that seeks 
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out perspectives both near and far. (For a critique of Sen’s use of Smith 
on this issue, see Fraser, 2012.) Sen realises that there can be severe 
difficulties in overcoming prejudices in certain societies, especially as 
some women will accept their subordination via a ‘faulty reading of local 
observations’. However, positional objectivity offers a ‘scientific 
contribution’ by exposing the illegitimate application of positional 
comprehension, instead of a transpositional understanding (Sen, 2010, 
pp. 162-163).   
 
Sen considers the notion of ‘“objective illusion”’, which he maintains is 
used in Marxist philosophy, and can be interpreted in terms of positional 
objectivity (Sen, 2010, p. 163). He argues that the ‘concept of objective 
illusion’ appears not just in Marx’s philosophical writings but also in 
Capital, Volume 1, and Theories of Surplus Value, although Sen does not 
offer any page references to support this. He specifies that one of Marx’s 
main concerns was to show how the supposedly fair exchange in the 
labour market in capitalism was illusory, even though the workers 
themselves, who are ‘robbed of part of the value of their products’, 
believed otherwise. So ‘an objective illusion…is a positionally objective 
belief that is, in fact, erroneous in terms of transpositional scrutiny’ and 
contains the idea of a positionally objective belief and the transpositional 
diagnosis that the belief is in fact mistaken. To illustrate this further, Sen 
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quotes at length the analytical Marxist G. A. Cohen on the notion of 
objective illusion in Marxian theory (Cohen, 1978, pp. 328-9).  
 
Cohen proposes that from a Marxist perspective on the natural sciences, 
the senses mislead us when confronted with the constitution of the air 
and the movements of heavenly bodies. He reflects that if someone could 
decipher, through breathing, different components in the air then they 
would have a nose that did not function as a normal human nose does. 
Similarly, a person who said that they could see the sun as stationary and 
the earth as rotating would be suffering from some form of impaired 
vision. Cohen asserts that visual experiences are like mirages rather than 
hallucinations. If a person does not see a mirage under the right 
conditions then there is something wrong with the person’s vision as their 
‘eyes have failed to register the play of lights in the distance’.  
 
Sen deduces from this discussion that the observations are positionally 
objective but also misleading or mistaken in terms of other more 
compelling criteria of truth that can be invoked by going beyond positional 
perspectives (Sen, 2010, 164). He concludes by stating that Marx’s own 
use of objective illusion was mainly for class analysis and this led him to 
investigate ‘what he called “false consciousness”’. Sen then abruptly 
leaves Marx and examines objective illusion in the health situation in 
developing economies through the self-perception of morbidity and 
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gender discrimination (Sen, 2010, pp. 164-167). Marx, though, never 
used the term ‘false consciousness’ to understand the nature of objective 
illusion in Sen’s sense of the term structuralist Marxism was mainly 
responsible for imputing this interpretation onto Marx (See for example, 
Althusser, 1971) but, as evinced above, it was also adopted by analytical 
Marxists such as Cohen. Marx used objective illusion to expose the 
ideological nature of the way the capitalist system is explained and 
commonly understood. Moreover, while Marx rejects arguments about 
justice and normative ethics, albeit not in a convincing manner given the 
passion with which he derided the inhumanity of capitalism, he explains 
scientifically how exploitation and oppression are a systemic creation 
within that system. (For the normative dimension to Marx’s work see 
Wilde, 1998 and 2001 and Thompson, 2015) So if Sen as a modern 
justice theorist wants to use Marx to aid his theory, then he needs his 
analysis to be focused from the outset on these outcomes that are 
intrinsic to capitalism. Unfortunately, Sen is unable to do this and 
undermines any proposals he has for creating a more just world.  
 
For Sen, overcoming objective illusion and achieving positional objectivity 
is also crucial as it has a special role for public reasoning when trying to 
understand demands for justice (Sen, 2010, p. 167). He notes how public 
reasoning can be limited in practice because people can misread the world 
they live in, especially if the ‘powerful influence of positionality has an 
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obscuring role in that social understanding’ (Sen, 2010, p. 168). Sen 
recognises that special attention should be devoted to trying to overcome 
the difficulties that can arise when trying to assess issues of justice and 
injustice. The role of positionality is ‘crucial in interpreting systematic and 
persistent illusions that can significantly influence - and distort – social 
understanding and the assessment of public affairs’.  
 
Sen has an optimistic view that we can achieve this objective 
positionality, but he does not comprehend that in a capitalist system one 
person’s objective positionality is another person’s objective illusion. To 
illustrate this, one only has to reflect, for example, on the way the UK 
Coalition government led by David Cameron responded to the financial 
crash that occurred in 2008. The position taken by the Coalition was to 
make excessive cuts to public expenditure and public services to reduce 
the budget deficit, causing mass unemployment and severe hardship for 
some of the most vulnerable people in society; a clear case of injustice. 
The mantra that covers these policies is that ‘we are all in this together’ 
and must suffer austerity for the national interest. This is then 
perpetuated in a generally suppliant and sympathetic media as the 
conventional wisdom with little riposte from the established Opposition. 
The powerful influence of Cameron’s ‘positionality’ aided by the media is 
certainly obscuring ‘social understanding’, because this is not the only 
way to respond to the crisis, as more enlightened theorists have indicated 
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from both non-Marxist (Stiglitz, 2010) and Marxist perspectives 
(Blackburn, 2011; Streeck, 2012).  
 
Sen’s desire that we can overcome positional illusions by ‘broadening the 
informational basis of evaluations’ ignores the power of the ideology of 
capitalism that Marx’s analysis can expose, which is why he concentrated 
on class issues. For Marx, the ruling ideas in any society are the ideas of 
the ruling class (Marx and Engels, 1976, p. 59) and what we are seeing in 
the case of UK austerity is ideology posing as positional objectivity in the 
service of capital, and financial capital in particular. Practical reasoning is 
never going to make Cameron and his successors change their minds. 
Something far stronger is needed for that.  
 
Sen is correct in praising Marx for identifying the objective illusions that 
permeate capitalism, but Marx did so to expose the naked truth about the 
system. Focusing on the way capitalism inverts reality and presents the 
world in the opposite way to how it really operates, exposes the class-
based nature of the system. Marx’s critique shows how the powerful can 
conceal their own actions in pursuing their own interests, while making it 
appear they are doing it for the good of everyone else.  
 
Just Redistribution 
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Marx also influences Sen’s discussion of what constitutes a just 
distribution of goods in society. Sen observes that Marx recognised in The 
Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875), the ‘inescapable conflict’ 
between the argument for eliminating the exploitation of labour on one 
side and for allocating according to needs on the other (Sen, 2010, p. x). 
In the first case, the relation is to the ‘justness of getting what can be 
seen as the product of one’s efforts’, whereas in the second case it relates 
to the demands of distributive justice. So Marx is important for 
recognising conflicting claims of justice and that is one of the main 
features of Sen’s own theory.  
 
Sen explores this issue with his example of the three children, Anne, Bob 
and Carla, who are quarrelling over who should get a flute (Sen, 2010, 
pp. 12-15). Sen’s use of highly abstract and hypothetical examples is 
often unconvincing and why The Idea of Justice has been criticised for 
offering few concrete cases of how its theory relates to practice in the real 
world (Deneulin, 2011, p. 790). Engaging with them means surrendering 
to the logic and assumptions immanent in that type of approach. I do so 
here on the understanding that the flute example is a priori flawed 
because it strips out the capitalist world and all the respective power 
relations belonging to that system where these decisions are made. With 
that said let us consider Sen’s deliberations.  
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Sen ruminates on varying scenarios for each of the children making 
claims on the flute: Bob, due to his poverty compared to the others, 
Carla, as she has made it with her own labour, and Anne who is the only 
one who can play it. Sen considers these competing claims from a Marxist 
and libertarian perspective and deduces that both would give the flute to 
Carla because they share the idea of the right to the fruit of one’s labour 
(Sen, 2010, p. 14). He sees this as uniting these seemingly opposed 
perspectives ‘no matter how uncomfortable each might be in the company 
of each other’. Commenting on this further in a footnote, Sen argues that 
Marx came to be sceptical of the right to one’s labour which, in The 
Critique of the Gotha Programme, he described as a ‘“bourgeois right”’ to 
be ultimately rejected with a ‘“distribution according to needs”’ being put 
in its place. (Sen refers us to Sen, 1975, Ch. 4 where there is no mention 
of Marx, and to an eclectic collection of essays by the analytical Marxist G. 
A. Cohen, 1988.)   
 
There is some confusion in Sen’s account here because Marx talks about 
these forms of distribution in two contexts not one, and they are not 
applicable to the example of the distribution of the flute. In The Critique 
of the Gotha Programme, Marx’s discussion is firstly about the lower 
phase of communist society that is ‘still stamped with the birthmarks of 
the old society from whose womb it emerges’, namely capitalism (Marx, 
1983, p. 17. For a more detailed discussion of Marx’s notion of 
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communism see Berki, 1983). Workers would still be imbued with the way 
they worked under capitalism and demand to be rewarded for the labour 
they had put into the production of goods. Workers at this stage of 
communist society receive back ‘after the deductions have been made’ 
exactly what they have given to it in terms of the expenditure of their 
labour. They then receive certificates for the amount of labour they have 
put in, which they can use to claim their portion of the means of 
consumption. Marx’s reasoning is that if the workers were given 
everything back that they had produced, then there would be no 
possibility for further developments of the productive forces and no 
general investment in society.  
 
As Sen correctly realises, this is what Marx refers to as a ‘bourgeois right’, 
because all individuals are ‘unequal’ in that they differ in terms of their 
physical and mental capacities and so can labour for a longer or shorter 
time as the case may be. They may also have dependents, so inequality is 
present at this stage of communist society (Marx, 1983, p. 18). What 
distinguishes Marx and Marxists from libertarians therefore is the 
necessity for workers to give up a portion of what they have expended for 
the good of society. A libertarian, on the other hand, would not agree with 
the ‘deductions’, as they would be seen as infringements of the right to 
keep the whole fruits of one’s labour (see for example, Nozick, 1991). 
Despite what Sen suggests, these two positions of Marxism and 
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libertarianism cannot be elided in the way they understand desert based 
on the labour expended. The libertarian principle that workers should get 
the full fruits of their labour would result in a society based on self-
interest and egoism, whereas the Marxist principle that workers should 
give something back would be far more communal. This would result in 
two quite distinct societies resting on two different notions of what is just. 
 
In the higher stage of communist society, the undesirable principle of 
calculating on the basis of a worker’s contribution will be replaced, as Sen 
correctly notes, by a distribution based on Marx’s edict of ‘from each 
according to ability to each according to need’ (Marx, 1983, p. 19).4 The 
emphasis now is on what your needs are regarding the differences 
between people rather than what you have put in to the production 
process as in the earlier stage of communist society. Sen fails to relate 
this back to his hypothetical example even though it can be slightly more 
appropriate to do so in this case. If communist society is based on doing 
what you are able to do and being rewarded on the basis of need, then 
who should get the flute? The right to the flute cannot be because you 
have made it, so it cannot go to Carla. The greatest need is Bob’s, 
because, Sen informs us, he has fewer toys than the other two. Anne’s 
claim that she should get it because she is the only one who can play the 
flute cannot trump the need of Bob. In a communist society, one might 
hope that Anne would help Bob to learn how to play the instrument. 
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Nonetheless, this is the problem stated earlier of being drawn into the 
logic of Sen’s examples because in this highest stage of communist 
society Bob’s poverty would not arise because the development of the 
productive forces was predicted by Marx, rightly or wrongly, to ensure a 
society of abundance which would allow the flourishing of human beings 
(Marx, 1976, p. 49 and 1973, p. 325). This of course could still mean that 
Anne might help Bob to play the flute so he too can develop the required 
skill. So despite Sen’s protestations to the contrary, it is possible to 
ground a decision here that does not descend into ‘arbitrariness’. Marx’s 
hope, one assumes, would be that Carla should see this as the right 
outcome for the greater good of society and, in doing so, would transcend 
the ‘narrow horizon of bourgeois right’ in a communist society where ‘all 
the springs of cooperative wealth fl w more abundantly’ (Marx, 1983, p. 
19).  
 
Additionally, the flute is not a commodity in Marx’s sense of the term 
because, in this example at least, it is not an object that is bought and 
sold on the market and is instead for immediate consumption. Moreover, 
where did Carla get the wood to make the flute? Why was the wood not 
available for the other two to try to make a flute? How did Carla and Anne 
have more toys than Bob initially? In a communist society, Bob would not 
have fewer toys, so this would also change the distributive outcome, as 
the flute would go to Anne who needs it most because she has got a 
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talent that she cannot realise. As mentioned earlier, this is the danger in 
Sen’s use of hypothetical and relatively abstract examples as they can 
lead to unrealistic and unconvincing conclusions.   
 
Sen also considers just distribution in the instance of the three children 
quarrelling over the flute when discussing equality of capability (Sen, 
2010, p. 297). Despite recognising the importance of equality, he rejects 
it when it is aligned to capabilities because it does not always ‘“trump” all 
other weighty considerations’ with which it might conflict (Sen, 2010, p. 
295). He understands the importance of freedom when assessing claims 
for equality and evaluating personal advantages but insists that there are 
‘other demands on distributional judgements, which may not be best seen 
as demands for equal overall freedom for different people’ (Sen, 2010, p. 
297). 
 
Relating this to the example of the flute and the three children, Sen 
contends that the child who has made the flute, (it was a female, Carla, 
but Sen mistakenly refers to her as ‘he’), deserves ‘just recognition’ for 
doing so (Sen, 2010, p. 297). Equality of capability would imply that her 
claim would be trumped by ensuring Anne and Bob have the resources 
necessary so they can make the flute with the possible detriment to the 
resources given to Carla. However, for Sen, such a claim ‘cannot be 
readily dismissed’ because a special status should be attached to the 
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efforts and rewards associated with labour that could undermine the case 
for equality of capability. He notes how the literature on the exploitation 
of sweated labour and the unjust rewards received by those doing the 
‘“real work”’ has strong links with this perspective, particularly in the 
Marxist tradition (Sen, 2010, p. 297 and 442, n.7). Sen is of course 
correct that this claim cannot be readily dismissed, but it does need to be 
reasoned more carefully. 
 
Sen is suggesting that Carla has the right to the fruits of her labour as 
she is the one who has made the flute. Sen tries to justify this further by 
citing the injustice of sweated labour but his reasoning here is flawed. The 
weakness of the hypothetical example in suggesting that Carla could have 
a claim to keep the flute as she has created it again ignores, as I 
mentioned earlier, how she came to have the resources to make it initially 
and the other children did not. This is the problem with hypothetical 
examples, and trying to link this claim to the reality of the exploitation of 
sweated labour does not help the argument either. Is Sen suggesting that 
these workers should retain the whole of the surplus that they are 
creating? If so, then following Marx means we have to reject this claim 
again because even in the lowest stage of communist society part of any 
surplus created must go back into investment for society as a whole. Sen 
seems to slip into a libertarian perspective that denies the need for 
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communal distribution of resources and rewards to create a more just 
society.  
 
Conclusion 
Sen’s ‘pride’ in Marx as an ‘intellectual instigator’ for his exploration of the 
idea of justice has centred around four themes. The first was Sen’s 
positioning of Marx in Sen’s own approach to justice by grouping him with 
thinkers who would not accept his desire for the abolition of capitalism, as 
Sen himself would not. Also, the Marx that Sen presents to us is the one 
appropriated by the analytical Marxism tradition, a diluted Marx reduced 
to unrealistic abstractions that consider issues of justice without locating 
them in the systemic nature of the capitalist system. Sen’s discussion of 
identity and social choice, although correctly grasping Marx’s notion of 
multiple selves, ultimately falls back into a methodological individualist 
approach of choice that Marx rejects, and could not form the basis of a 
just communist society. As regards the issue of objective illusion, Sen’s 
search for positional objectivity (so we can come to agree on what is just 
or unjust through practical reasoning) is undermined by the power of 
capitalist ideology and ruling class interest. Finally, Sen’s utilisation of 
Marx’s redistributive theory mistakenly elides Marx with libertarian 
perspectives which are based on very different notions of what is just in 
relation to the reward for labour expended. Sen’s retreat into the 
hypothetical abstract world is symptomatic of analytical Marxism and its 
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inherent weaknesses. This retreat fails to make a distinction between 
Marx’s different phases of communist society, which has major 
implications for what is and what is not a just distribution according to 
Marx, and which is not arbitrary as claimed by Sen. Consequently, failing 
to link his idea of justice with Marx’s rejection of capitalism means Sen’s 
desire to ‘eliminate…remediable injustices’ (Sen, 2010, p. vii) although to 
be welcomed, is more akin to building ‘castles in the air’ (Marx and 
Engels, 1987, p. 117).  
 
                                                     
Notes 
I would like to thank Tony Burns, Colin Tyler, David Weinstein, Lawrence 
Wilde and the anonymous reviewers of this journal for their helpful 
comments on a previous version of this article.  
 
1  Sen’s fellow justice theorist Martha Nussbaum also does this in her 
selective use of Marx. See Nussbaum (2006). For a Marxist critique of her 
positon and one-sided use of Marx see Wilde (2012). 
 
2 This pertinent point is made in a perceptive article by Deneulin but is 
not developed as I have done here (See Deneulin, 2011, p. 796). 
 
Page 28 of 32International Journal of Social Economics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Social Economics
29 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
3 For a robust rebuttal of this approach as not being in any way Marxist 
because its methods are bourgeois and its politics reactionary see Wood, 
1989, with whom I agree. 
 
4 There has been much dispute over the origin of this phrase with some 
suggesting it preceded Marx but for a rebuttal of this see ‘Notes from the 
Editors’, 2014. 
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